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JUVENILE COURT AND ARREST RECORDS
BBy Adrienne Volenick"
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in Illinois in 1899, the underlying
philosophy of the juvenile justice system has always been that
children should be protected from the rigors of criminal
prosecution and at the same time be provided with the care
and guidance needed to secure their rehabilitation and re-
orientation into society. Because juvenile offenders are young
and impressionable, they are thought to be capable of learn-
ing to behave in a socially acceptable manner given the proper
supervision and surroundings.
Drafters of juvenile statutes have recognized that how-
ever benevolent a juvenile system may be in design, and how-
ever successful it may actually be in design, and however
successful it may actually be in instilling the proper attitudes
and values in a child, society as a whole considers a graduate
of the system the equivalent of an ex-convict. The average
citizen sees no difference between the act of assault with a
deadly weapon committed by an adult and that same act
committed by a child. Likewise a commitment to a training
school or other juvenile facility is viewed as the equivalent of
imprisonment, an outlook also shared by confined children
who see their tenure in an institution as "doing time." Fur-
thermore, commitment to a juvenile institution is viewed in
the same harsh light whether imposed for an act that would
be a crime if committed by an adult or for a status offense
such as habitual truancy. Because these attitudes are so pre-
valent, it is obvious that a child who has been processed
through the juvenile system may suffer the same social and
economic ostracism faced by an ex-convict.
There are many instances where a person will face dis-
crimination because of his contact with the juvenile court
system. Job opportunities may be limited because application
forms often require the applicant to state whether or not he
has ever been arrested or taken into custody. Even where no
conviction has resulted, the fact of arrest may be sufficient
grounds for rejection. For example, a survey taken nearly ten
years ago revealed that approximately 75% of sampled em-
ployment agencies in New York City, as a matter of regular
* Staff Attorney, National Juvenile Law Center, 3642 Lindell Blvd.,
St. Louis, Mo..63108, (314) 533-8868.
procedure, did not refer for employment any applicant with
a record, whether or not arrest was followed by conviction.1
Educational opportunities may also be impaired when
application forms require information about previous arrests
or prior court action. Even if this information is not the basis
for automatic rejection, it seems clear that it is, at a mini-
mum, considered. Because of the nature of the information
and the public's general suspicion of any contact with police,
undoubtedly the consideration is usually to the applicant's
detriment.
Recognizing the near impossibility of changing societal
views toward juvenile offenders, many legislators have at-
tempted instead to combat the harmful effects of a delin-
quency adjudication by providing for concealment of juvenile
records, on the grounds that such concealment will aid the
child's reintegration into society.
II. THE USE OF JUVENILE RECORDS IN OTHER
PROCEDURES
As one means of minimizing the adverse effects of a
juvenile adjudication, many state statutes provide that no
adjudication, disposition, or evidence from a juvenile pro-
ceeding is admissible against a child in any criminal or other
action, except in subsequent juvenile proceedings involving
the same child or as an aid to sentencing in a later criminal
proceeding against the same person.2 In the past, a statute
of this sort was considered an adequate basis for preventing
the introduction of a witness' juvenile record to impeach him. 3
However, since the decision in Davis v. Alaska,' it is evident
that under certain circumstances a juvenile record will be
admissible for purposes of impeachment. In Davis, the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the defendant
1. See, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society (1967).
2. See, e.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Uniform Juvenile Court Act, Section 33 (1968), here-
inafter referred to a "UJCA."
3. See, e.g., Deja v. State, 168 N.W.2d 856 (Wis. 1969), and Rivas
v. State, 501 S.W.2d 918 (fex. Crim. App. 1973).
4. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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was restricted from questioning the key witness, a juvenile,
about his status as a probationer. The witness was on pro-
bation because he had been found delinquent on two charges
of burglary. Because he was testifying in a case involving theft,
the court felt that it was possible that the child had cooperated
with the police in identifying the defendant so that he him-
self would not fall under suspicion. The court held that cross-
examination concerning the juvenile's status was imperative
to test his credibility. The trial court's restriction of the cross-
examination effectively denied the defendant's rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination-rights so important that
they outweighed any adverse effects resulting from forcing
the child to testify as to his juvenile record.
In In re A.S., 5, an adult was granted access to a portion
of a juvenile transcript in order to show prior inconsistent
statements by a juvenile witness and so impeach his credi-
bility. Although this holding was also based upon the ac-
cused's right to confrontation, an important factor in the
court's decision was the fact that the juvenile witness had
initiated the complaint, making the truthfulness and accuracy
of his statements crucial to the state's case.
Despite the Davis decision, it is unlikely that courts
will allow juvenile records to be utilized indiscriminately for
purposes of impeachment. The case does not hold that past
adjudications of delinquency are always admissible. It merely
suggests that in considering admissibility, the court should
carefully weigh the state's policy of protecting the juvenile
against the accused's right to confrontation.
Following Davis, a New Jersey court in State v. Brown,6
refused to compel the state to disclose the juvenile delinquency
records of the alleged victims of an assault. It did, however,
order that the state reveal whether the victims currently had
juvenile petitions pending against them or whether any of
them were presently on probation.
Many pre-Davis cases appear to have reached conclu-
sions fully consistent with it and so remain accurate represen-
tations of the current law. For example, in Malone v. State,
a murder conviction was reversed because the trial judge had
allowed the state to inquire, on cross-examination, about
previous charges brought against the accused in juvenile
court. In this context the court held that exposure of a juvenile
record could only be used to discredit the accused by marking
him as one with a criminal record, despite the non-criminal
nature of juvenile proceedings.
Where the credibility of the defendant was an important
issue on a charge of receiving stolen property (i.e., did he
know the motorcycle in question was stolen?), the court found
that cross-examination regarding prior arrests that had not
resulted in conviction was prejudicial. 8
In Fortsan v. State,' juvenile officers testified that a
defendant had a bad reputation for being peaceful and law
abiding. This was held admissible under the evidentiary rules
admitting testimony as to reputation.
It is generally accepted that a juvenile record may be
introduced in later criminal proceedings against a person as
part of a pre-sentence report. It is then considered relevant
as an aid to the judge in making an informed, intelligent
5. 327 A.2d 260 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. N.J. 1974).
6. 334 A.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1975).
7. 200 N.E. 473 (Ohio 1936).
8. People v. Wasson, 188 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 1971).
9. 474 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
disposition of the case.' 0
Waiver or transfer to criminal court is sometimes
thought to authorize the receiving court to open juvenile
files and records for inspection by persons having a legitimate
interest therein, such as the prosecutor and defense counsel.11
Usually, however, use is still limited to perusal by the judge
in determination of sentence.2
Consideration of a juvenile record has been found ad-
missible in a hearing on an application for bail, because such
a proceeding concerns the amount of control necessary to
secure the accused's appearance and the possibility that his
release would pose a threat to public safety. Therefore, the
court needs information on the defendant's background in
order to make an intelligent decision about his release.' 3
III. ACCESS TO JUVENILE COURT RECORDS
Juvenile court records generally consist of the juvenile
petition, summons, notice, findings, orders, decrees, judg-
ment and motions. In addition, social reports prepared by
court personnel dealing with the child's background may
be included. Nearly every state statutorily limits access to
these records to the juvenile or his representatives, court per-
sonnel or an agency having custody of the child. 4 At the
same time, however, the juvenile judge is often authorized
to release this information to an interested third party. This
kind of provision is further evidence of legislative recognition
of the need to protect children from the harmful effects of
having their record made public. However, by giving the
judge discretion to release this information to "outsiders,"
legislators have provided a loophole to leak information to
prospective employers, educational institutions or the mili-
tary, and so adversely affect the child. Nearly all states adhere
to the fiction that this kind of statute will protect a child.
Only Iowa specifically provides that the legal record of the
juvenile court be a public one. Iowa does, however, exclude
the reports of juvenile court probation officers, social workers,
doctors, psychologists, and juvenile homes from public scru-
tiny unless the court sanctions their release."
As long as anyone other than the child or his representa-
tive has access to court records-as long as a judge may
authorize inspection without the permission of the child-
these records will haunt him, labeling him a criminal and
adversely affecting his future both economically and socially,
regardless of the noble intentions of legislators to the con-
trary.
A more effective means of protecting juvenile records
10. See Massey v. State, 256 A.2d 270 (Del. 1969); Neely v. Quatsoe,
317 F.Supp. 40 (E.D. Wisc. 1970); Taylor v. Howard, 304 A.2d
891 (R.I. 1973); and People v. LaPine, 209 N.W.2d 726 (Mich.
App. 1973). But cf People v. McFarlin, 199 N.W.2d 684 (Mich.
App. 1972), and Laven v. State, 515 P.2d 578 (Okla. Crim. App.
1973), in which the courts relied on statutory interpretation to
conclude that juvenile records were not to be considered in the
sentencing procedure.
11. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1968).
12. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 468 P.2d 1314 (Nev. 1972).
13. Brunetti v. Scotti, 353 N.Y.S.2d 630 (S. Ct. 1974).
14. See, e.g., UJCA, Section 54, and Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, ModelActs for Family Courts and State-Local
Children's Programs, Section 45 (1975), hereinafter referred to as
"Model Act."
15. IOWA CODE §232.54-232.55.
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from inquisitive eyes is incorporated into the statutes of many
states where either "sealing," "expungement," or "destruc-
tion" of records is authorized. Under these provisions, a
child or his representative or even the court on its own motion
can initiate proceedings to expunge the juvenile's record.
In most instances expungement is granted only after a speci-
fied period of time has elapsed since the termination of the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' 6 In other jurisdictions a
child may be eligible for expungement of his record when he
reaches a certain age.17
Nearly all states provide that expungement by the juve-
nile court is discretionary. In Colorado records may be sealed
only if the child is not currently under investigation in con-
nection with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude, and if he has not been convicted
of either since the termination of the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court. Often expungement statutes require that juveniles
be rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the court. For example,
in Indiana the juvenile judge must determine that the subject
of a petition to destroy records "is reformed and has been
on good behavior for a period of at least two years" before
issuing an order to destroy.
Very few states provide for the automatic expungement
of a record without any action by the child and without setting
any conditions."8 Expungement statutes would appear to
offer some measure of relief to a child who has been adjudi-
cated a delinquent but may be inadequate to fully protect
him from suffering some adverse consequences. If, for ex-
ample, the statute does not also authorize the court to seal
police records, will the public have access to them as so render
nugatory the beneficial effects of sealing court records?
IV. ACCESS TO ARREST RECORDS
Arrest records pose many problems in the juvenile area,
and only a few solutions have thus far been implemented
that have shown any indication of being even minimally ef-
fective. In many jurisdictions arrest records of juveniles must
be kept separate from the arrest records of the general
populace."
Statutes in approximately half of the states place limita-
tions on the police in their accumulation and preservation
of fingerprints and photographs of a juvenile taken into
custody. 0 In several states the consent of the juvenile judge
is required before a child under a certain age may be photo-
graphed or fingerprinted. 2' In other areas, dissemination
16. In Utah a one-year waiting period is required, .UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-10-117; South Dakota requires two years, S.D. CODE
§26-8-57.1; Nevada, three years, NEV. REV. STAT. §62.275;
and California, five years, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §826.
17. In Missouri a child who reaches 17 may petition the court to
seal his record. MO. STATS. ANN. §211.321. In Alaska the
court must order that a juvenile record be sealed when a child
turns 18. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.090. And in Washington,
destruction may be effected after a person's twenty-first birthday.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.250.
18. But see ALASKA STAT. §47.10.090(a), which provides for the
automatio sealing of a juvenile record within 30 days of a child's
eighteenth birthday or, if jurisdiction is retained past eighteen,
within 30 days of the date on which the court relinquishes juris-
diction over him. See also MONT. REV. CODE § 10.1232.
19. See, e.g., UJCA, Section 55.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 38-815(a).
is limited. For example, Montana law prohibits the filing
of any juvenile photographs or fingerprints with the F.B.I.,
the Montana identification bureau or any agency other than
the one of origin, except for comparison purposes in the
original investigation. These materials must be destroyed
after completion of the proceedings unless the court orders
their retention for a specific period on good cause shown."
In Ohio the consent of the judge is required prior to
fingerprinting or photographing unless the act allegedly
committed is a felony and there is probable cause to believe
the child was involved in it. Destruction of such materials
is mandatory if a complaint is not filed, is dismissed after
filing, or when the child reaches twenty-one and has had
no criminal additions to his record after his eighteenth
birthday.
Several statutes provide for the sealing or destruction
of arrest records when court files are ordered sealed. 3 The
importance of destroying these records should not be under-
estimated, since they may exist even where a child is appre-
hended and subsequently released without court action, or
where he is detained and subsequently acquitted of all com-
plicity in the crime.
In New York, in recent years, authority has split over
the issue as to whether the Family Court, which is authorized
to seal its own records, may do the same with police records.
An early case, Statman v. Kelley, 24 found no statutory author-
ization for ordering the expungement of arrest records. In
Statman students were arrested for the misdemeanor of
trespassing and subsequently released after the charges were
dropped. The court went so far as to conclude that orderly
government required that these records be kept.2" The oppo-
site conclusion was reached in In re Smith, 26 where the court
ordered expungement of all indicia of court and police records
dealing with the dismissed charges of unlawful assembly and
riot. Noting that, in the eyes of many, arrest carries a pre-
sumption of guilt, the court concluded that because the peti-
tion was withdrawn due to a complete lack of evidence, ex-
pungement was crucial. The court found implicit authority
to deal with police records in §784 of the Family Court Act,
which allowed the court to authorize the inspection of juvenile
police records. In Henry v. Looney, " a child was accused of
attempted burglary and then released after a satisfactory
explanation was given. The court ordered his police record
sealed because its maintenance would provide no benefit
to society but did represent great potential harm to the child.
The same reasoning in support of expungement was used
in In reJ., 2 where a juvenile petition was dismissed for failure
by the state to present a prima facie case.
The records may prevent, hinder or delay the con-
sideration of the arrested person for employment,
22. MONT. REV. CODE §10-1218(2)(c).
23. See, e.g., UJCA, Section 57.
24. 262 N.Y.S.2d .799 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
25. See also S. v. City of New York, 300 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1973),
where the court recognized that it had the inherent power needed
to seal its own records but held that it lacked the authority to do
the same with police records. See also, In re A.P., No. D3245/73
(N.Y. Faro. Ct., August 23, 1974) (Clearinghouse No. 13,487A
(3pp.).)
26. 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Faro. Ct. 1970).
27. 317 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
28. 353 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Faro. Ct. 1974).
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referral by employment agencies, acceptance into
colleges and apprenticeship programs, public
housing, the armed forces and obtaining a license.
These records may also be used to determine
whether to make a subsequent arrest, to deny re-
lease prior to trial or an appeal and to determine
sentence. 29
Although not a juvenile case, Doe v. County of West-
chester" presents an interesting technique for preventing
dissemination of information. There the petitioner was ad-
judicated a youthful offender and sentenced to a prison term.
He applied for an order modifying his sentence on the ground
that he wished to join the Army and was told by the court
that this would be done if he were inducted. The court held
that by statute a police agency, including the sheriff's office,
is barred from making available to any public agency, includ-
ing the Army, official files relating to the case of a youthful
offender. The court also concluded that this restriction was
in compliance with 18 U.S.C. §1001, which provides that
anyone within the jurisdiction of a department or agency
of the United States who knowingly falsifies or conceals a
material fact or makes false statements can be fined or impri-
soned. In addition to enjoining the sheriff from making any
disclosure to the Army with respect to the petitioner's arrest
and adjudication record, it also ordered that his name be
deleted from public records.
A similar action might be useful in the juvenile context
to prevent the dissemination of records. If a local statute
contains a provision similar to Section 55 of the UJCA or
Section 46 of the Model Act, which limit access to law enforce-
ment records, then an attorney may want to ask for a man-
damus to compel law enforcement officers to comply with
the provisions prohibiting the dissemination of such informa-
tion to the military, a prospective employer or the representa-
tive of an educational institution's permanent office. The
major problem with this kind of action is that, to be effective,
it must predate release of the record. A child must anticipate
the possibility that his record will be divulged and be prepared
to bring action to prevent it. All too often he will not be aware
either that this information is not available to the public in
general, or that he need not reveal it when asked by someone
about his past record. For instance, in T.N.G. v. Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 3 the court
upheld a statutory five-year waiting period before an order
sealing arrest records could be obtained. However, the court
also held that the incident, in which children were taken into
custody but released without further action, could not be
described as an arrest, and therefore any child involved could
answer "no" to any question as to his arrest record on an
application for employment or admission to an institution of
higher education.
A recent decision in Washington, Monroe v. Tielsch, 32
came out against expungement of both court and arrest
29. Id. at 697. See also, In re Anonymous, No. D1143173 (N.Y.Fam. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974) (Clearinghouse No. 13,488A (3pp.)), and
In re Anonymous, No. D-3112/71 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., March 20,
1974) (Clearinghouse No. 12,575E,F (8pp.)), where police records
were also ordered expunged.
30. 358 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
31. 484 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1971).
32. 525 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1974).
records. There, four juveniles ranging in age from ten to
sixteen sought expungement of their arrest records and their
court files, social and legal. Each had been charged with
committing indecent liberties and one had also been charged
with shoplifting, possession of a dangerous weapon, and
burglary. At the hearing on the indecent liberties charge
the alleged victim, with the acquiescence of her father, de-
clined to testify and charges were dismissed. The subsequent
petition to expunge was aimed at all the records involved,
but expungement was denied for several reasons. The court
was of the opinion that other sections of the statute provided
sufficient protection against the adverse effects of unauthor-
ized dissemination of arrest records by prohibiting release
to prospective employers or nonrehabilitative education
institutions. Complete expungement of records was held
to be contrary to the philosophy of the juvenile court because
it would serve to hide the child's background. Without this
knowledge the court could not implement a course of action
suited to correct and aid the juvenile. The court also con-
cluded that law enforcement agencies have a legitimate in-
terest in maintaining arrest records. Concurring in part and
dissenting in part, one judge felt that the records of arrest
should be expunged. His reasoning was based on the right
to privacy, as well as on the fact that an arrest record alone
is of no probative value, since it indicates neither guilt nor
innocence. He did indicate, however, that official court
records should be retained.
A New Jersey court reached a conclusion similar to
Monroe when it found that arrest records were necessary
for the proper and effective functioning of a police depart-
ment and were part of the overall police facilities for criminal
investigation, analysis, evaluation and prevention.33
The California courts have taken a similar approach
when petitioned to have arrest information sealed. In
T.N. G. v. Superior Court, 3 the court stressed that the police
were not authorized to release arrest or detention information
to third persons, but that those records were necessary to
rehabilitate properly juveniles who become involved with
the juvenile system on subsequent occasions. Note that in
Washington, New Jersey and California, these juveniles
would again be eligible to request expungement of their court
records, at least following the expiration of a certain period
of time. But all of these decisions discourage attempts to
conceal contacts with the juvenile courts.
V. ARGUMENTS FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF AN
ARREST RECORD
According the the court in Wilson v. Webster, 3 s a hear-
ing to determine whether arrest records should be expunged
must be held. In Wilson students were arrested under highly
questionable circumstances in accordance with emergency
regulations promulgated to cope with riot conditions existing
in the area. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain
further lawless conduct by authorities and an order to cancel
the arrest records for all class members acquitted of criminal
charges or for whom charges had been dismissed without
33. Dugan v. Police Dep't City of Camden, 271 A.2d 727 (App. Div.
NJ. 1970).
34. 484 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1971).
35. 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1972).
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prosecution. The district court refused preliminary relief
and dismissed the action. Agreeing with the decision to refuse
preliminary relief, but feeling that the claim relating to arrest
record cancellation should not have been dismissed, the Ninth
Circuit held that the plaintiffs should have been allowed an"opportunity to show, if they were able, that those records
should be expunged, for their continued existence may seri-
ously and unjustifiably serve to impair fundamental rights
of the persons to whom they relate." 36
Once in court to present a petition for expungement
of records, either court or arrest, several supporting argu-
ments can be made. Expungement has often been ordered
where the plaintiffs have successfully challenged the legality
of the arrest itself. Thus, in United States v. McLeod, 37 the
court granted the requested expungement of records of adult
blacks arrested in an effort by authorities to discourage voter
registration. In Hughes v. Rizzo, 38 the court ordered the
expungement of the arrest records of hippies picked up in
mass arrests clearly made without probable cause.
The court took the same stand in Wheeler v. Good-
man.3" There, twelve minors alleged harassment by local
police that culminated in a raid of an apartment. The occu-
pants were arrested, taken to the police station and finger-
printed and photographed. In court they were released for
lack of probable cause to indicate the commission of any-
crime. Discussing the plaintiffs' request for expungement of
their arrest records, the court stated the general rule that"an equity court should not order expunction unless extreme
circumstances exist, for example, where records do not serve
to protect society or where their future misuse is likely." 0
The court found that the facts this case presented were an
example of "extreme circumstances," since the records in
question, while theoretically existing to facilitate criminal
investigation, could perform no such function because the
plaintiffs had committed no crimes. Therefore, criminal
investigation would not be served by retention, and the plain-
tiffs could suffer unreasonable harm. The court stressed that
expungement is not always the proper remedy when a person
is acquitted or released without prosecution, but was proper
in this case.
In Menard v. Mitchell,4I a person was picked up by the
police and held for two days without a hearing on the legality
of his detention and then released when police found no basis
for charging him with a crime. Subsequently he learned that
the F.B.I. had obtained his fingerprints as well as other in-
formation about him. The court stated:
[I]t is hard to see how an arrest not based on prob-
able cause, followed by complete exoneration of
the person arrested could be used to support any
adverse inferences whatsoever regarding him.
[Ihf appellant can show that his arrest was not
based on probable cause it is difficult to find con-
stitutional justification for its memorialization in
the F.B.I.'s criminal files.' 2
36. Id. at 1283-1284.
37. 385 F.2d 734 (Sth Cir. 1967).
38. 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
39. 306 F.Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 401
U.S. 987 (1971).
40. Id. at 65.
41. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 491-492.
On remand, the district court declined to order expungement
of the F.B.I. records but did limit their distribution.' 3 How-
ever, in a subsequent appeal the circuit court ordered that
the F.B.I. expunge the incident from its criminal identifica-
tion files. The court found the authority to do so inherent in
its powers and not dependent on express statutory provi-
sions.4
A challenge to the retention of records where arrest has
led to either dismissal or acquittal may be based upon a viola-
tion of the right to privacy. In the last century this right has
become an established principle of American civil jurispru-
dence recognized as basic to the Bill of Rights. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 4S the intimacies of the marriage relationship
were held to be protected by the right to privacy. In Stanley v.
Georgia, 46 the right to possession of obscene materials in
one's own home was established. Eisenstadt v. Baird7 ex-
tended the Griswold rule to unmarried individuals, and in
Roe v. Wade, 4  the Supreme Court found the right of a
woman to terminate an unwanted pregnancy covered by her
right to privacy. Several courts have thus ordered the expunge-
ment of an arrest record when the harm to the individual's
right of privacy because of adverse unwarranted consequences
outweighs the public interest in retaining these records.' 9
It can also be argued that the retention of arrest records
of juveniles who have been either acquitted or have had
charges against them dismissed violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The stigma that attaches
to a child because of his arrest adversely affects his reputation
and so subjects him to a deprivation of property without a
hearing.5 0 Where records of a child's arrest are disseminated
to educators or employers, he is exposed to the loss of funda-
mental rights and opportunities.5 '
Where a person has suffered because of the existence
of a record dealing with charges for which he has not been
found delinquent, he arguably has been subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment since punishment must be reason-
ably related to the crime for which it is imposed and must
be meted out equitably. It should not be imposed merely
because of status.5 2 The unintended consequences that may
43. 328 F.Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
44. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also,
Gomez v. Wilson, 323 F.Supp. 87 (D.C. 1971); Bilick v. Dudley,
356 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), as well as U.S. v. Kalish, 271
F.Supp. 968 (D. Puerto Rico 1967), where the court held that
an acquittal or discharge without conviction negated any benefit
to society that the retention of arrest records might bring, but
that mistaken arrest in and of itself was not sufficient grounds
for expungement.
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
47. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kalish, 271 F.Supp. 968 (D. Puerto Rico 1967);
Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d 211 (Wash. App. 1971); and Davidson v.
Dill, 503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972). Although these are all cases deal-
ing with adults, the retention of the arrest record of a juvenile
presents the same potential harm. See Doe v. Scott, No. 74-0231-
GBH (N.D. Cal.), plaintiffs' memorandum (Clearinghouse No.
12,071C (38pp.)) for an excellent discussion of the right of privacy
in connection with the expungement of juvenile arrest records.
50. See. e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
51. For an expanded discussion of this point, see Doe v. Scott, Clear-
inghouse No. 12,071C (38pp.), and In re Doe, Clearinghouse No.
6178A (34pp.).
52. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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flow from the retention of an arrest record where a child
must be presumed legally innocent can be a harsh punish-
ment, limiting his future opportunities.s3 In Doe v. Scott,
plaintiffs also argued that the retention of arrest records of
those convicted with those of the innocent violated the equal
protection clause, because a stigma of criminality attaches
to both groups equally. Unless the state can show a compel-
ling state interest to justify this practice, it should be struck
down.
VI. CONCLUSION
The stated policy of nearly every state is to protect the
confidentiality of a child's juvenile record. However, juvenile
records appear to be available to anyone who seeks access
to them. This is due in part to the loose language typically
found in juvenile statutes.
Provisions for sealing or expungement of records usually
apply only to court records-not those of arrest or those in
53. See Doe v. Scott, Clearinghouse No. 12,071C (38pp.).
the possession of social agencies. In addition, nearly all
statutes require a person to apply for the expungement of
his own record but permit this only after a lengthy waiting
period. Further, the judge has great discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny the application.
If the benevolent, rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile
court are actually to be served, then expungement of all
records, court and arrest, should be automatic. There should
be no unwieldly process that the child must initiate in order
to get results. Rather, the court, police, and social agencies
should be required to expunge all records when juvenile court
jurisdiction is terminated.
In addition, the statutes should authorize the expunge-
ment of arrest records that do not result in the filing of a
petition or which result in the acquittal of the" child. Since
no state statute currently provides for such a procedure,
persons interested in drafting new proposals along these lines
should see Michigan House Bill 4704, Section 44 (1975), '
drafted by a committee including Legal Services lawyers
assisted by the National Juvenile Law Center.
54. Clearinghouse No. 13,227 (35pp.).
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The Closing and Divestiture of Public Hospitals:
Public Responsibility for Health Care of Indigents
As the national economic picture worsens, the number
of persons suffering substantial income loss to the point of
indigency is increasing. For most of these newly poor, and
indeed for the many other previously poor, Medicaid stan-
dards of indigency are too low to enable them to qualify for
benefits. Even in those states with Medically Needy programs,
there are increasing numbers of people who are closed out of
the private sector of medical care for financial and other
reasons, including transportation problems, shortage of
physicians willing to accept Medicaid patients for racist,
classist, cultural or financial reasons, language barriers, etc.
The traditional havens of last resort for those seeking medical
care but unable to pay for it have been the public hospitals.
In California, state law specifies that responsibility for
care of indigents lies with the counties (WELF. AND INST.
CODE §17000). Historically, counties have chosen to meet
that obligation by establishing county hospitals, which, de-
spite many shortcomings, comprised the only health care de-
livery system with continuous access for the poor. As of early
1975, 16 of California's network of 49 county hospitals have
been closed or have transferred their management from the
county to other bodies, and 5 more are on the verge of closure.
Other counties have instituted stricter billing and collection
procedures, all of which adversely affect access of indigents to
health care.
Many factors account for this divestiture of hospital
operation by county government. As the state sought to cut
back its share of direct Medi-Cal (Medicaid in California)
payments to county hospitals, forcing the counties to assume a
greater share of hospital costs, the state also decreased reim-
bursement levels under Medi-Cal. Coupled with another law
(SB 90) forbidding county governments from raising the
property taxes to offset increased costs, operational losses
from the county hospitals were running into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars.
The greatest inflation in hospital cost was due in large
part to the infusion of public dollars into the private, uncon-
trolled health industry through Medicare and Medicaid. The
generous allocation of Hill-Burton construction funds to
private hospitals greatly increased the bed supply and offered
competition to the county hospitals for those patients with
Medi-Cal coverage or other paying capabilities, while "dump-
ing" on the public facilities the sickest, poorest and otherwise
least desirable patients. Hospital utilization has been decreas-
ing, due primarily to shorter average lengths of stay. These
lower occupancy rates in the private hospitals have also in-
creased the competition for Medi-Cal and other paying
patients.
County governments have increasingly fallen under
pressure from the private hospitals and local medical societies
to save private facilities at the expense of the public ones,
using the arguments that private care is better for the patients,
and that government should not be in competition with the
private sector, but should merely fill in the gaps left by private
care. In California, the historical basis for this attitude can be
traced to a 1933 court decision enjoining Kern General Hospi-
tal, the county institution, from accepting paying patients, the
court holding that local governments cannot "engage in pri-
vate business or enterprise" (Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App.
2d 540, at 544). Although the 1965 California Medicaid legis-
lation did empower and encourage county institutions to
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